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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The recent proposal to eliminate estate and gift taxes is not only immoral and a 
poor allocation of resources,2 but also is unconstitutional.  Irrespective of their 
ideology, virtually all American lawyers will initially dismiss this accusation as 
frivolous because it conflicts with their tradition of equating conceptions of 
“constitutionality” with United States Supreme Court opinions.  The Court has long 
been highly deferential to Congress in federal tax law cases.3  It is inconceivable that 
the current Court would find anything “irrational” in a facially neutral law 
eliminating all estate and gift taxes.  Indeed, if I sat on that bench, I would join my 
far more conservative colleagues in upholding such a law against any constitutional 
challenges.  The taxation power remains the central government’s primary tool for 
social/economic transformation and military operations.  After all, money is the 
“sinew” of war.4  When in doubt, it is best to follow Justice Holmes’ admonition in 
his Lochner v. New York dissent to a decision invalidating a state law that limited 
bakers’ working hours: “[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular 
economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation on the citizen to 
the State or of laissez faire.”5 
It already should be obvious that the only way to sustain any allegation of 
unconstitutionality against these tax policy changes is to extend meanings of 
“constitutionality” beyond the legalistic paradigm of constitutional adjudication.  
Consider the following tawdry example of political action that is seemingly 
“unconstitutional” but would probably be “legal” because the Supreme Court would 
                                                                
1Professor of Law, Cleveland State University.  B.A., Princeton University; J.D., 
University of Chicago Law School.  The author would like to acknowledge the Cleveland-
Marshall Fund for its assistance. 
2For a general overview, see RONALD CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY 
(1982). 
3For example, the Court is reluctant to examine Congressional “motives” behind particular 
tax policies so long as the taxes produce some revenues, even when the “primary purpose” of 
the tax appears to be a restriction of certain activities.  Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 
506, 514 (1937) (upholding tax on gun dealers). 
4THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 232 (James Madison) (Jack Rakove ed., 1999). 
5198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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almost certainly not intervene.  Suppose that the House and Senate had sought to 
impeach President Clinton solely for having an extramarital affair (leaving aside 
such issues as perjury, cover-ups, character assassination, and lying)?  Clinton’s 
lawyers would have told the House and Senate that a vote for impeachment is an 
abuse of Congressional constitutional discretion.  His opponents would have been 
using his sexual escapades as a pretext for partisan political warfare, because such 
wayward behavior is not a “High Crime or Misdemeanor.”  Adultery (or whatever 
one prefers to label Clinton’s peculiar sexual proclivities) is neither a crime nor a 
misdemeanor, much less a “High Crime and Misdemeanor” threatening the nation.  
Nevertheless, Clinton could have been impeached (it is hard to imagine a politician 
surviving such disclosures fifty years earlier).  Should Clinton have next appealed his 
defeat to the Supreme Court, it most likely would have rejected his claim as a 
nonjusticiable political question.  The Court decided in Nixon v. United States6 not to 
review a federal judge’s procedural challenges to the Senate’s impeachment 
procedures.  Although the Clinton case would have involved a different part of the 
impeachment text (“High Crimes and Misdemeanors” instead of “The Senate shall 
have sole power to try all impeachments”)7 the Court should follow the Nixon 
precedent.  If the Court is unwilling to second-guess procedural choices, where it has 
great expertise, it should be far more reluctant to reverse substantive political 
decisions reflecting the will of the elected branches and indirectly the citizenry.  It 
seems absurd for nine unelected members of the Court to reverse such an important 
political decision as the poll-driven termination of a Presidency.  It is time for the 
country to move on whenever its leader has lost the “mandate of heaven,” 
irrespective of reasons.   
There are many more instances of major constitutional powers that are not 
regulated by the Supreme Court.  Rather, they are controlled by unwritten 
“constitutional conventions” similar to the numerous “constitutional conventions” 
that help organize the English Constitution.8  The elected branches can pack the 
Court because the text is silent about the number of Justices.  The Senate and House 
may expel their own members for virtually any reason.  Congress has vast authority 
over lower federal court jurisdiction and Supreme Court appellate decision.  There 
are no legal constraints on the Senate’s discretion in using its Advise and Consent 
power to ratify treaties or Presidential nominees.  Thus, it is possible in all these 
areas for politicians to act “unconstitutionally,” in the sense that they are violating 
the text, spirit, structure, precedent, and purposes surrounding a particular section of 
the Constitution, but “legally” because there is nothing the Supreme Court could or 
should do.  The politicians and the American electorate determine many important 
Constitutional questions, not the Court.  After all, Clinton barely survived the 
impeachment process primarily because the polls steadily indicated that a majority of 
Americans did not think his repellant actions warranted impeachment.  The 
electorate helped create constitutional impeachment doctrine and complete an 
additional precedent that can be invoked and distinguished in the future.  Whether 
                                                                
6506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
7U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
8See, e.g., James G. Wilson, American Constitutional Conventions: The Judicially 
Unenforceable Rules That Combine With Judicial Doctrine and Public Opinion to Regulate 
Political Behavior, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 645 (1992). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss4/9
2000] THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ELIMINATING ESTATE 773 
one agrees with the ultimate outcome of the Clinton episode or not, it coincides with 
James Madison’s theory of checks and balances that went far beyond formal 
governmental structures: “[I]n the last resort, a remedy must be obtained from the 
people, who can by election of more faithful representatives, annul the acts of 
usurpers.  The truth is, that this ultimate redress may be more confided in against 
unconstitutional acts of the federal than the state legislatures…”9 
While these examples validate the claim that politicians can act 
unconstitutionally but legally (and thus refuting any rigid equation of 
“constitutionality” with “legality” and any theory that places the Supreme at the apex 
of all constitutional conflicts), they do not necessarily demonstrate that estate and 
gift taxes have constitutional dimensions.  There are vast differences between the 
areas of political discretion that both the Constitutional text and the Supreme Court 
from Marbury v. Madison10 to Judge Nixon’s impeachment case11 have left to the 
nation’s elected leadership and the economic issue of wealth transfer taxes.  To 
extend notions of constitutionality this additional distance, we need to resurrect 
earlier constitutional conceptions from such influential political thinkers as Aristotle, 
David Hume, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson.  Even a cursory glance at the 
Founding generation reveals that it had much broader understandings of 
constitutionality, including wealth allocation in general and estate distributions in 
particular.  Ultimately, this historical/analytical inquiry is more important than any 
quibbling over the preferred meanings of a particular word like “constitution.”  
Should the reader remain unconvinced about the utility of using the phrase 
“constitutionality” to analyze and normatively assess estate and gift tax policy, this 
work will nevertheless not have been in vain if it has placed that immediate problem 
within a broader historical/conceptual perspective. 
II.  ARISTOTLE’S CONSTITUTIONS 
Even if one must rely on the inspired vagaries of brilliant translators, Aristotle is 
worth studying for several reasons.  First of all, he laid the groundwork for much of 
contemporary political/legal thought, an attraction for lawyers and politicians 
seeking well-tested, traditional authority for their arguments.  Aristotle’s intellectual 
influence can easily be traced to the formation of the Constitution, because Madison 
(along with his Enlightenment colleagues) was profoundly inspired by Ancient 
Greek history and political theory.  One need only envision Jefferson’s columns at 
Monticello and the University of Virginia for evidence of that generation’s gratitude 
and respect for their Greek forebears.  Suffused with genius, Aristotle’s work 
remains more provocative and developed than most contemporary political and legal 
theory.  Quite simply, it is far easier for the average citizen to develop useful, 
humane insights from Aristotle and Madison than from such arcane intellectuals as 
Heiddeiger, Lacan, and Habermas.  The vast differences in time and culture are also 
helpful.  We perceive how our major political conflicts are merely variations of 
                                                                
9THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 257 (James Madison) (Jack Rakove ed., 1999) (emphasis 
added). 
105 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803) (leaving the conduct of foreign affairs largely within 
the President’s discretion). 
11Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (federal judge’s challenge to Senate 
impeachment procedures presented nonjusticiable political question). 
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ancient disputes, enduring controversies that have been deeply analyzed by 
somebody who has no interest in our particular issues.  In other words, one shouldn’t 
study those suspect “dead white males” because they are white or male.  But in some 
ways it helps that they are dead. 
Aside from stylistic and translation problems, Aristotle is somewhat difficult to 
grasp because he self-consciously gives different definitions to many of his major 
terms and then blends those terms into two elegantly circular systems, one normative 
and one descriptive.  In particular, he uses the word “constitution” in many different 
ways and then commingles those definitions with such words as “citizen” and 
“virtue,” which have their own cluster of normative and analytical definitions.  Here 
are a few examples that undermine the parochial vision equating constitutional 
inquiry with Supreme Court jurisprudence.  The notion of  “constitutionality” first 
appears in Aristotle’s Politics as a psychological concept, a reminder that Aristotle 
was the ultimate interdisciplinary scholar, blending anthropology, economics, 
psychology, politics, morality, law and theory into illuminating analytical and 
normative models: “At all events we may firstly observe in living creatures both a 
despotical and a constitutional rule; for the soul rules the body with a despotical rule, 
whereas the intellect rules the appetite with a constitutional and royal rule.”12  
Although Aristotle was an infamous apologist for slavery, he conceded that the 
institution injured both master and slave: “[T]he rule of a master is not a 
constitutional rule.”13  He then used the term to cover political systems: “Our 
purpose is to consider what form of political community is best of all for those who 
are most able to realize their ideal of life.  We must therefore examine not only this 
but other constitutions, both such as actually exist in well-governed states, and any 
theoretical forms which are held in esteem, so that what is good and useful may be 
brought to light.”14  Incidentally, it is worth noting that Aristotle was not a one-
dimensional utilitarian or efficiency expert; he wanted constitutions that were both 
“good” and “useful.”  In his discussion of Plato’s Republic, he narrowed his 
conception of “constitution” to state action: “Socrates has definitely settled in all a 
few questions only; such as the community of women and children, the community 
of property, and the constitution of the state.”15  Turning to Plato’s Laws, he applied 
the word to his famous distinction between monarchies, aristocracies, and 
democracies—the rule of the majority, the elite, or a single person.16  “Some, indeed, 
say that the best constitution is a combination of all existing forms.”17  He relied on 
history to empirically evaluate these rival systems: “The superiority of the 
Carthaginian form of government is proved by the fact that the common people 
                                                                
12ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1990 
(Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, POLITICS]. 
13Id. at 1992. 
14Id. at  2000. 
15Id. at 2007. 
16ARISTOTLE, NICOMANCHEAN ETHICS, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF 
ARISTOTLE 1834-35 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, NICOMANCHEAN 
ETHICS]. 
17ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 12, at 2008. 
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remains loyal to the constitution; the Carthaginians have never had any rebellion 
worth speaking of, and have never been under the rule of a tyrant.”18  Although he 
frequently used cognates of “constitution” as terms of praise19 (he preferred regulated 
republics which he calls “constitutional government” instead of perverted 
“democracies” in which the majority pursue their interests at the expense of the 
common good),20 he also approached these issues more amorally.  He explained why 
citizens must conform to their constitutional order (which now incorporated the 
entire society, not just the government): “[O]ne citizen differs from another, but the 
salvation of the community is the common business of them all.  This community is 
the constitution; the excellence of the citizen must therefore be relative to the 
constitution of which he is a member.”21  A few pages later, he reverted to a more 
bounded definition: “The words constitution and government have the same 
meaning.”22  At times he sounds like a modern political scientist: “A constitution is 
the organization of offices in a state, and determines what is to be the governing 
body, and what is the end of each community.  But laws are not to be confounded 
with the principles of the constitution; they are the rules according to which the 
magistrates should administer the state, and proceed against offenders.”23  Here is 
another fluctuation towards breadth: “[T]he constitution is so to speak the life of the 
city.”24 
Aristotle’s next conception of “constitution,” one that could just as easily have 
been penned by James Madison or Karl Marx, is the most relevant for our purposes: 
“For a constitution is an organization of offices, which all the citizens distribute 
among themselves, according to the power which different classes possess (for 
example the rich and the poor), or according to some principle of equality which 
includes both.”25  In other words, one crucial constitutional question is the actual 
distribution of wealth and power among the citizenry: “But the form of government 
is a democracy when the free, who are also poor and the majority, govern, and an 
oligarchy when the rich and noble govern, they being at the same time few in 
number.”26  I believe this issue is the most important constitutional question now 
facing the United States.  Although the formal “political constitution” of United 
States retains the structure of a republic, the country has in many ways become an 
oligarchy.  The most rabid leftist could not have written a more disturbing lead 
paragraph than the following from a recent Wall Street Journal article entitled 
Bush’s Donors Have a Long Wish-List and Expect Results:  
                                                                
18Id. at 2019 
19ARISTOTLE, CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF 
ARISTOTLE 2349 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, CONSTITUTION OF 
ATHENS]. 
20ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 12, at 2046. 
21Id. at 2026.  (emphasis added) 
22Id. at 2030. 
23Id. at 2046. 
24Id. at 2056. 
25ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 12, at 2047. 
26Id. at 2048. 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
776 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:771 
For an idea of what a George W. Bush presidency would be like, peek in 
on a fund-raising gala here Wednesday afternoon during the Republican 
National Convention.  Amid the harmonies of the Philadelphia Boys 
Choir will gather the underwriters of the richest political campaign ever—
the lawyers and corporate executives who have helped build a $92.3 
million campaign fund and who, as shareholders in Bush, Inc., will hold a 
bit stake in a Bush presidency.27 
Aristotle sought a Constitution whose strength and stability did not overwhelm 
most citizens’ opportunity to achieve a life of “happiness,” which he once defined 
normatively as “an activity of the soul in accordance with complete excellence.”28  
The two greatest threats to any constitutional community were external conquest and 
internal strife usually caused by the perpetual tensions between the rich and the poor.  
Aristotle believed that a “constitutional democracy” was the best form of 
government because it best represented and protected the masses from rapacious 
rulers.  In addition, that system had the strongest tendency to create a powerful 
middle class that gravitates toward a life of virtuous moderation.  The middle class is 
less likely than the rich and their progeny to become decadently and arrogantly 
ambitious, putting pursuit of wealth and glory above the community.  Nor do they 
suffer from the turbulent demoralization of poverty, for “poverty is the parent of 
revolution and crime.”29  The middle class operates as a buffer between the two more 
dangerous factions.  Furthermore, a vibrant middle class life provides more 
opportunities for more citizens to achieve some degree of happiness through leading 
a virtuous life. 
Aristotle bequeathed more than generalities to future generations.  He praised 
Athen’s ancient lawgiver Solon for eliminating all existing public and private debts30 
(an alternative worth considering today to resolve the crushing debt burdens of the 
“undeveloped countries”).  Because he feared the rich as much as the poor, he 
proposed legal constraints to their power.  First of all, he recommended that the city 
exile anyone who became too wealthy because that person would threaten the 
constitutional order.  Under Trop v. Dulles,31 the Supreme Court would find that 
draconian solution a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”  In Trop, the Court held that Congress did not have the power to strip 
individuals of their fundamental right to citizenship.  Far more importantly for our 
purposes, he discussed in some depth the issue of wealth transfers at the time of 
death.  Neither the underlying dispute nor the accompanying arguments have 
changed very much over the past two thousand years.  Notice how Aristotle 
combines his moral standards (opposition to greed) with his more practical norms 
(preserving the community).   Before reading this somewhat lengthy excerpt, I 
should acknowledge that I edited out the sexist parts: 
                                                                
27Greg Hitt, Bush’s Donors Have a Long Wish-List and Expect Results, WALL ST. J., July 
31, 2000, § A, at 1. 
28ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 16, at 1740. 
29ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 12, at 2008. 
30To reduce class tensions, Solon cancelled all debts.  ARISTOTLE, CONSTITUTION OF 
ATHENS, supra note 19, at 2343.  
31356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
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The mention of avarice naturally suggests a criticism on the inequality of 
property.  While some of the Spartan citizens had quite small properties, 
others have very large ones: hence the land has passed into the hands of 
the few.  And this is due also to faulty laws: for, although the legislator 
rightly holds up to shame the sale or purchase of an inheritance, he allows 
anybody who likes to give or bequeath it.  Yet both practices lead to the 
same result. ***   [T]he whole number of Spartan citizens fell below 
1000. The result proves the faulty nature of their laws respecting property; 
for the city fell in a single defeat; the want of men was their ruin.  There is 
a tradition that, in the days of their ancient kings, they were in the habit of 
giving the rights of citizenship to strangers, and therefore, in spite of their 
long wars, no lack of population was experienced by them; indeed, at one 
time Sparta is said to have numbered not less than 10,000 citizens.  
Whether this statement is true of not, it would certainly have been better 
to have maintained their numbers by the equalization of property.32 
Of course, this statement does not prove that Aristotle would believe that the 
United States should preserve estate and gift taxes.  Although it is legitimate to 
employ hallowed authorities to explore recurring problems and bolster particular 
outcomes, it is sophistry to argue that the time-tested thinker would now agree with 
one’s particular recommendations.  We can never know what great thinkers like 
Aristotle, Hume, and Madison would think of modern times, because enough has 
changed that they might alter any of their conclusions (as well as some underlying 
assumptions).  One would hope, for instance, that Aristotle would no longer embrace 
slavery, sexism, and racism.  Furthermore, they would have been raised in our 
culture, successful members committed to its growth and their own advancement.  
They could still make amazing insights about our social order, but those insights 
would not have the peculiar impartial clarity attributable to time, distance, and death.  
For instance, Aristotle might conclude that the United States has so much power and 
so many middling citizens that it can violate many of his old norms and ignore many 
of his proposals while still maintaining stability, a dynamic middle class, and a 
republican form of government.  After all, Aristotle’s constitutional approach 
requires each of us to make an empirical assessment of our society: How 
appropriately are wealth and power distributed?  It is inevitable that we will disagree 
about the answer to this basic constitutional question.  Where some will argue that 
major private corporations have become the real “citizens” who run this country, 
others will reply that never before have so many people been able to lead a 
comfortable life providing them with the possibility of achieving some degree of 
happiness.  Where some see only injustice, others perceive vast opportunity. 
III.  ENLIGHTENMENT MODIFICATIONS OF ARISTOTLE 
The pagan Aristotle helped provide the groundwork for the Enlightenment 
figures who imagined and then designed secular states no longer intertwined with 
religious institutions..  But some of his norms and beliefs clashed with aspects of 
Enlightenment thinking.  Aristotle believed that avarice, wealth, and luxury 
threatened the body politic.  Large, imperial countries could never preserve 
republican norms and constitutional structures.  Blessed with an equally formidable 
                                                                
32ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra, note 12, at 2015-16. 
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capacity to master a wide range of disciplines, David Hume helped revolutionize 
political thought just as he transformed metaphysics, epistemology, causation, moral 
philosophy, psychology, and political economy.  Hume believed that the pursuit of 
luxury would provide the social adhesive necessary to replace Aristotle’s virtue and 
Christianity’s religious enthusiasms.  Aristotle’s virile virtues emanated from the art 
of war, while Christianity disintegrated into several factions that had drenched 
Europe in blood for centuries.  In Hume’s materialistic future, good manners would 
combine with relentless acquisitiveness to create a relatively peaceful middle class 
world revolving around commerce: “[T]he eternal contrarieties, in company, of 
men’s pride and self-conceit, have introduced the rules of Good Manners or 
Politeness, in order to facilitate the intercourse of minds, and an undisturbed 
commerce and conversation.”33  In an extraordinary passage, Hume explained how 
and why the ancient Greek and Roman conceptions of “virtue” must be changed:  
Luxury, or a refinement of the pleasures and conveniences of life, had not 
long been supposed the source of every corruption in government, and the 
immediate cause of faction, sedition, civil wars, and the total loss of 
liberty.  It was, therefore, universally regarded as a vice, and was an 
object of declamation to all satirists, and severe moralists.  Those, who 
prove, or attempt to prove, that such refinements rather lead to the 
increase of industry, civility, and arts regulate anew our moral as well as 
our political sentiments, and represent, as laudable or innocent, what had 
formally been regarded as pernicious and blameable.34 
Americans have never fully accepted Hume’s embrace of luxury.35  In 1766, “The 
Tribune” wrote from South Carolina: “That luxury naturally creates want, and that 
want, whether artificial or real, has a tendency to make men venal, are truths that are 
too evident to be disputed.  Luxury therefore leads to Corruption, and whoever 
encourages great luxury in a free state must be a bad citizen; so, of course, whatever 
government does the same must be a bad government, because it therein acts against 
the interest of the community.”36  Nor did some members the Revolutionary 
generation see any necessary contradiction between property rights and opposition to 
concentration of wealth.  Benjamin Rush assumed that “Liberty and property from 
the basis of abundance, and good agriculture.”37  Such principles led him to oppose 
both slavery and large concentrations of private power: “Now if the plantations in the 
islands and southern colonies were more limited, and freemen only employed in 
                                                                
33DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 139 (Tom L. 
Beauchamp ed., 1998) (1777). 
34Id. at 13-14 (emphasis in original). 
35See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Toward 
Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L. J. 119 (1974) and Carolyn C. Jones, The Moral Hazard 
of the Estate Tax, 48 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 729 (2000). 
36The Tribune, No. xvii (1766), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITINGS DURING 
THE FOUNDING ERA 93 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983). 
37Benjamin Rush, An Address to the Inhabitants of the British Settlements in America 
Upon Slave-Keeping (1773), in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITINGS DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 
220 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983). 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss4/9
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working them, the general product would be greater, although the profits to 
individuals would be less,-- a circumstance this, which by diminishing opulence in a 
few, would suppress Luxury and Vice, and promote that equal distribution of 
property, which appears best calculated to promote the welfare of Society.”38  Many 
Americans proudly distinguished their culture from “the Old World, drowned in 
luxury and lewd excess!”39  Because “experience proves that none are more 
insatiable than the rich,” efforts must be made to “maintain a mediocrity and 
equipoise.”40  Concentrated wealth corrupts not just those who have it, but the entire 
nation: “Its influence on civil elections is still more pernicious.  Money is frequently 
the most forcible logic, and he that carries the longest purse, will often carry the most 
votes.”41 
On the other hand, Carter Braxton opposed all sumptuary laws, Agrarian laws, 
and “unjust attempts to maintain… equality by an equal division of property.”42  He 
explained that people living in a bountiful country will “always claim a right of using 
and enjoying the fruits of their honest industry, unrestrained by any ideal principles 
of government, and will gather estates for themselves and children without regarding 
the whimsical impropriety of being richer than their neighbors.  These are rights 
which freemen will never consent to relinquish, and after fighting for deliverance 
from one species of tyranny, it would be unreasonable to expect they should tamely 
acquiesce under another.”43  The virulently articulate Fisher Ames condemned pro-
debtor laws as violations of the social contract: “Without my consent, or a crime 
committed, neither you, nor any individual, have a right to my property. I refuse my 
consent; I am innocent of any crime.  I solemnly protest against the transfer of my 
property to my debtor.”44  But more was at stake than individual rights: “[W]e shall 
see our free Constitution expire, the state of nature restored, and our rank among 
savages taken somewhere below the Oneida Indians.  If government do worse than 
nothing, should make paper money or a tender act, all hopes of seeing the people 
quiet and property safe, are at an end. Such an act would be the legal triumph of 
treason.”45 
                                                                
38Id. 
39Philips Payson, A Sermon (1778), in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITINGS DURING THE 
FOUNDING ERA 536 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983). 
40[Anonymous], Rudiments of Law and Government Deducted from the Law of Nature 
(1783), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITINGS DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 580-81 
(Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983). 
41Peres [Perez] Fobes, An Election Sermon (1795), in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITINGS 
DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1002 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983). 
42Carter Braxton, An Address to the Convention of the Colony and Ancient Dominion of 
Virginia on the Subject of Government in General, and Recommending a Particular Form to 
Their Attention (1776), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITINGS DURING THE FOUNDING 
ERA 334 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983). 
43Id. at 334-35. 
44Fisher Ames, From Confederation to Nation (1786), reprinted in 1 WORKS OF FISHER 
AMES 43 (William B. Allen ed., 1983). 
45Id. at 44. 
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Because James Madison played such a major role in convening, creating, 
defending, and amending the Constitution, modern intellectuals--particularly those 
with a lawyer’s perspective that habitually searches for the “intentions” of legal 
documents’ “framers”-- can easily make the mistake of equating James Madison’s 
politics with his fellow Americans.  Even Jack Rakove’s Pulitzer Prize winning book 
Original Meanings46 is largely an analysis of Madison.  The first problem with 
focusing on Madison is that some of his views changed over the course of his career.  
But more importantly, his was only one of many perspectives.  Consider, for 
example, how differently Madison and his Federalist coauthor Alexander Hamilton 
reacted to Hume. 
A Virginia aristocrat immersed in precapitalist, agrarian economics, Madison 
never fully accepted Hume’s vision.  Along with his good friend and mentor Thomas 
Jefferson, Madison foresaw a vast empire of virtuous yeoman, the physiocratic 
version of Aristotle’s middle class.  There was no place for a large central 
government, powerful military forces, manufacturing, and decadent, luxurious living 
(although Jefferson had a lifelong interest in expensive wines and other 
extravagances).  Hume’s greatest legacy to Madison was a heightened fear of 
divisive factionalism,47 usually caused by religious differences or wealth disparities.  
In his famous Federalist Number Ten, Madison relied upon Hume to explain how a 
large republic would be more stable than a smaller one; factions would have less 
ability to seize and maintain power at the expense of the public good.  The large 
nation’s multiplicity of religious sects and economic interests would prevent any 
single interest group from seizing power.48  He was even more blunt in a letter to 
Jefferson: “Divide et imperia, the reprobated axiom of tyranny, is under certain 
qualifications, the only policy, by which a republic can be administered on just 
principles.”49  This theory, later to be verified by historical experience, undermined 
Aristotle and Montesquieu’s belief that republics must remain small to endure.    
Madison’s Federalist coauthor Alexander Hamilton was far more receptive to 
Hume’s entire approach to political economy.  In addition to pursuing wealth and 
luxury, the central government should create such institutions as national banks, 
public credit, and powerful military forces.50  Hamilton agreed with Hume that 
“corruption” was a tool necessary to solidify state and private power into a 
formidable alliance.  Although Jefferson’s reporting of his bitter rival Hamilton’s 
views at a dinner party cannot be considered completely reliable, the following 
summary was probably not far off the mark: “Hamilton’s financial system … had 
                                                                
46JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1997). 
47GARY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 20-23 (1981).  Wills expressly 
grounded his analysis in prior work by Douglas Adair, That Politics May Be Reduced to a 
Science: David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist (1957), reprinted in 
DOUGLASS ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: ESSAYS BY DOUGLASS ADAIR 132-51 
(Trevor Colburn ed., 1974). 
48THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 167 (James Madison) (Jack Rakove ed., 1999). 
49James Madison, Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 
WRITINGS 151 (Jack Rakove ed., 1999). 
50STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 118 (1992). 
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two objects.  First, as a puzzle to exclude popular understanding and inquiry.  
Second, as a machine for the corruption of the legislature; for he avowed the opinion 
that man could be governed by one of two motives only, force or interest: force he 
observed, in this country, was out of the question; and the interest therefore of the 
members must be laid hold of, to keep the legislature in unison with the 
Executive.”51  Hamilton dismissed John Adam’s argument that “corruption” had no 
place in a republic: “[P]urge the constitutional system of corruption, and give to it’s 
popular branch equality of representation, and it would become an impracticable 
government: as it stands at present, with all it’s supposed defects, it is the most 
perfect government that has ever existed.”52  It is certainly possible that Hamilton 
was only using the word corruption in the Humean sense of the executive branch’s 
careful distribution of patronage,53 but it is also quite possible that Hamilton was 
candidly acknowledging the darker side of politics.   
Along with the raw political competition caused by personal ambition, these 
basic ideological differences largely explain why Jefferson and Madison so quickly 
opposed Hamilton after the Constitution’s ratification.  Much to Hamilton’s surprise, 
they publicly and futilely battled his first major proposal as Secretary of Treasury 
under George Washington’s presidency.  Hamilton recommended that the federal 
government assume all state and national public debts at face value.  Unlike 
Jefferson and Madison, he was not upset that speculators had recently purchased 
much of the debt from unsuspecting rural citizens “by the most fraudulent practices 
and persuasions that they would never be paid.”54  Indeed, he wanted much of the 
country’s capital to be concentrated in relatively few hands so it would not be 
quickly consumed but would rather remain a source of power for the central 
government and wealth for economic development.55  Many of Hamilton’s financial 
initiatives brought immediate benefits not just to a group of powerful private 
individuals, but also to some of the legislators who supported the plans and the 
former Treasury official William Duer,56 leading Madison to complain “The stock-
jobbers will become the pretorian band of the Government, at once its tool and its 
tyrant; bribed by its largesses, and overawing it by clamours and combinations.”57  
During the New York ratification debates, Hamilton denied that such a philosophy 
was aristocratic.  He too was a patriot.  Even if fortune allowed him to remain in the 
elite, he had broader interests: “But what reasonable man, for the precarious 
enjoyment of rank and power, would establish a system, which would reduce his 
                                                                
51Thomas Jefferson, The Anas-Selections (1791-1806), in JEFFERSON WRITINGS 666 
(Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). 
52Id. at 671. 
53ELIKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 50, at 106. 
54Jefferson, supra note 51, at 666. 
55ELIKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 50, at 117. 
56Id. at 274. 
57Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (August 8, 1791), quoted in ELKINS & 
MCKITRICK, supra note 50, at 244. 
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nearest friends and his posterity to slavery and ruin?”58  There was a streak of 
hypocrisy in the Virginia Republicans’ opposition.  For decades, Virginians had 
made and lost millions on land speculation based upon generous land grants from the 
state government.59 
Relying exclusively on such hoary figures as Madison and Hamilton also distorts 
the quest to determine the historical “meaning” of the Constitution.  Madison 
believed that the Framers were irrelevant; the really important purposes and 
interpretations can be gleaned from the ratification debates because those public 
proceedings best reflected the beliefs and will of the people of each state.  After all, 
it was the people who ratified the Constitution, not the Framers.  In other words, the 
Supreme Court’s interpretative methodology of relying heavily on a narrow group of 
leaders, most notably Madison and Hamilton in The Federalist Papers and the 
Framers at the Constitutional Convention, gives the document an upper class patina.  
Such a narrow historical inquiry fails to capture the class rage of many Anti-
Federalists, a fury the Founders had to account for while framing and later defending 
the document.  Not surprisingly, some of the Anti-Federalists hated the rich, 
anticipating Charles Beard’s argument that a lot of the Constitution’s supporters 
were in it for immediate gain.  Samuel Bryan saw the new Constitution as “a most 
daring attempt to establish a despotic aristocracy among freeman, that the world has 
ever witnessed,”60 destroying any proper conception of republican government: “A 
republican, or free government, can only exist where the body of people are virtuous, 
and where property is pretty equally divided, in such a government the people are 
sovereign and their sense of opinion is the criterion of every public measure…”61  It 
is also easy to overlook the lust for dominion and wealth that invariably motivated 
those who were in power but were neither strongly committed to republicanism as a 
principle nor heavily involved with the formation of this particular Constitution, 
which would only immortalize a select few who remain the focal points of most 
constitutional history. 
Madison and Jefferson remain attractive because they provide us with several 
ways to develop a constitutional morality that is neither excessively maudlin nor 
cynical.  Madison had two basic conceptions of “republicanism.”   The formal 
definition consisted of two principles: The government must be derived from the 
people and all branches of the government must be traced back to electoral 
authority.62  Under this approach, the new Constitution was more “republican” than 
the Articles of Confederation because state legislatures had created the Articles while 
                                                                
58Alexander Hamilton, Alexander Hamilton Discusses Federal Taxation and Denies that 
His Views are Influenced by Personal Ambition (June 28, 1788), in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION 835 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter Alexander Hamilton Discusses 
Federal Taxation].  
59CHARLES ROYSTER, THE FABULOUS HISTORY OF THE DISMAL SWAMP COMPANY: A STORY 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON’S TIMES 40-43 (1999). 
60Samuel Bryan, A Most Daring Attempt to Establish A Despotic Aristocracy, 
INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER (Oct. 5, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 57 
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993). 
61Id. at 56. 
62THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 196 (James Madison) (Jack Rakove ed., 1999). 
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the people would ratify the Constitution through their election of delegates to special 
conventions in each State.  The central government’s three branches satisfied 
Madison’s republican criteria of direct or indirect representation: the people elected 
the members of the House, they chose the State representatives who would elect 
members of the Senate; they picked the electors who would choose the President; 
and they even more indirectly determined who would sit on the Supreme Court 
because those appointments were made by the President and the Senate who were 
ultimately accountable to the electorate.  Under this structural definition, the United 
States government remains a republic.   
We have already encountered Madison’s broader republican vision-- a land of 
independent farmers living simple, virtuous lives.  There was no place for cities, 
manufacturing, national banks, large armies, national debt, and concentrated private 
power.  The federal government would be primarily involved in international affairs; 
the States would provide education and enforce basic common law rights; and the 
people would directly participate only through the hallowed jury system.  Both 
“banking establishments” and “standing armies” were threats to the humane culture 
of republicanism.63  
Charles Beard overstated his case in the Economic Interpretation of the 
Constitution when he claimed that the Framers were primarily motivated to create a 
new central government to cash in the governmental debts they had purchased at 
prices far below face value.  As subsequent critics pointed out, many Anti-
Federalists also held a significant amount of governmental debt.  But there can be no 
doubt that the Convention sought to protect the wealthy from the depredations of 
excessive democracy, typified by Rhode Island’s paper money and debt forgiveness 
schemes.64  Madison feared two particular forms of majority tyranny: religious 
persecution and exploitation of the rich.  Along with religious minorities, the wealthy 
were the Constitution’s original “suspect classes” warranting additional 
constitutional protections.  The opulent were not to be protected just because they 
had money.  Facially neutral property laws encourage every individual’s diverse 
skills, particularly the skill to obtain wealth: “The diversity in the faculties of men 
from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to the 
uniformity of interests.  The protection of these faculties is the first object of 
government.  From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring 
property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately 
results: and from the influence of these on sentiments and views of the respective 
proprietors, ensues a division of society into different interests and parties.”65  
Madison’s materialism contained its own limits; the government’s duty was to 
defend those first generation rich who could acquire wealth.  It is not as important to 
worry about heirs, who have shown no special acquisitive capacities.  Madison also 
favored the rich (old and new), because they are likely to be good role models 
committed to stable government: “If the law allows an opulent citizen but a single 
                                                                
63Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor (May 28, 1816), in JEFFERSON WRITINGS 
1395 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). 
64In Federalist Number Ten, Madison deplores “A rage for paper money, for an abolition 
of debts, for an equal distribution of property, or any other improper or wicked project….”  
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 48. 
65Id. at 161 (emphasis added). 
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vote in the choice of his representative, the respect and consequence which he 
derives from his fortunate situation, very frequently guide the votes of others to the 
objects of his choice…”66  Under contemporary constitutional forms, the rich have 
far better tools than popular admiration; they donate hundreds of millions of dollars 
to choose and control the political leadership of both major parties.   
Although Madison feared the “leveling spirit”67 of majority tyranny far more than 
aristocratic oppression, he understood that the rich and powerful could undermine a 
republic: “Give all power to property, and the indigent will be oppressed.”68  The 
goal was to create an “equilibrium of interests:”69  Madison wrote of the need to look 
beyond formal constitutional structures to actual distributions of wealth and power; a 
corrupt government “may support a real domination of the few, under an apparent 
liberty of the many.”70  Because wealthy aristocracies are both inevitable and 
desirable, the problem never ends: “The most difficult of all political arrangements is 
that of so adjusting the claims of the two Classes as to give security to each and to 
promote the welfare of all.”71  Like Aristotle, Madison understood that “haughty 
heirs”72 could become “tyrannical nobles”73 willing to sacrifice the “supreme object” 
of “real welfare of the great body of the people”74 to their pursuit of pleasure, power, 
and glory.    They often start by diluting the “right of suffrage:” “A gradual 
abridgment of this right has been the mode in which Aristocracies have been built on 
the ruins of popular forms.”75  At the Constitutional Convention, he warned “A 
Republic may be converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the 
number capable of being elected, as the number authorized to elect.”76  The current 
American system, which favors rich candidates, wealthy donors, and powerful 
corporations, has so little to offer the average citizen that barely fifty per cent of the 
people vote in Presidential elections.  While the powerful will predictably claim that 
such silence is an endorsement of the status quo, it often signifies alienation and 
                                                                
66THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 315 (James Madison) (Jack Rakove ed., 1999). 
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despair.  One only needs to talk to a number of citizens who do not vote. They 
understand that the Supreme Court created a “right of donation” has diluted the 
“right of suffrage.” 
The Founders’ primary goal of protecting the affluent from “turbulent” 
democratic “follies”77 was tempered by a fear of aristocratic excesses.  Many of them 
knew their own class’s motives too well to assume the elite’s perpetual good faith.  
These fears influenced virtually every aspect of the Constitution’s structure.  George 
Mason ironically defended the Constitution’s prohibition against placing 
congressional members in executive positions because the alternative would 
“[complete] that Aristocracy which was probably in the contemplation of some 
among us…[by]… inviting into the Legislative Service, those generous and 
benevolent characters who will do justice to each other’s merit, by carving out 
offices and rewards for it.”78  Hugh Williamson opposed making the Senate the 
ultimate decision-maker in Presidential elections because “Referring the appointment 
to the Senate lays a certain foundation for corruption and aristocracy.”79  These fears 
eventually persuaded the Convention to make the House of Representatives the 
institution to resolve Presidential elections that could not be initially determined by 
the Electoral College.80  Linking the President with the House of Representatives 
reinforced Gouvernour Morris’ constitutional vision.  Although Morris was very 
conservative, he observed that “Wealth tends to corrupt the mind and to nourish its 
love of power, and to stimulate it to oppression.  History proves this to be the spirit 
of the opulent.”  Even if the legislature can no longer create paper money, it could be 
“seduced” and turned into a legislative tyranny favoring the rich.  Thus, the 
Constitution needs to insulate the President from the wealthy: “The Executive 
therefore ought to be so constituted as to be the great protector of the Mass of the 
people.”81  Many of the Framers who believed in a property qualification for federal 
voters defended their position because it would weaken the power of the wealthy, 
who create an unholy alliance with the poor at the expense of the autonomous middle 
class: “The aristocracy will grow out of the House of Representatives.  Give the 
votes to people who have no property, and they will sell them to the rich who will be 
able to buy them.”82 
Anti-aristocratic concerns extended beyond formal governmental structures to 
private power’s effects on the entire culture.  For the Founders, the United States 
Constitution was just part of an overall republican system.  John Dickinson “doubted 
the policy of interweaving into a Republican constitution a veneration for wealth.  
He always understood that a veneration for poverty and virtue, were the objects of 
republican encouragement.”83  To maintain a relative degree of equality and to 
                                                                
77Id. at 42. 
78Id. at 451. 
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concerns.  Id. at 584, 586-87. 
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prevent the rise of an elite class with “a distinct interest” from the people, Charles 
Pinkney explained that the overall constitutional system (which includes state law) 
must use inheritance taxes to maintain republican equality: “The destruction of the 
right of primogeniture and the equal division of the property of Intestates will also 
have an effect to preserve this mediocrity; for laws invariably affect the manners of a 
people.”84  Anticipating the future break between Hamilton and Madison, Pierce 
Butler was concerned that the clause authorizing payment of past debts would be 
construed to favor “the Blood-suckers who had speculated on the distresses of others, 
as to those who had fought and bled for their country.”85 
While the Twentieth century meaning of anarchy applies to the collapse of law 
and order, Madison applied that term to the triumph of either faction over the 
common good which furthers the interests of all: “In a society under the forms of 
which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as 
truly be said to reign, as in a state of nature where the weaker individual is not 
secured against the stronger.”86  Heavily influenced by Malthus, Madison and 
Jefferson feared that in the future the relentlessly increasing population would 
overwhelm the American frontier’s capacity to maintain an agrarian republic.  At 
that time, the poor would flock to cities, where wealthy demagogues hostile to 
republican norms and institutions would manipulate them and corrupt them with 
anti-republican norms.  Like Aristotle, Madison foresaw that the poor would either 
revolt or combine with the rich to destroy the republican system.87  The Aristotlean 
solution was to create and maintain a healthy middle class, what Benjamin Franklin 
called a “happy mediocrity”88 in contrast to the deplorable wealth disparities he 
observed while touring Ireland.89  The predominant Madisonian solution was to 
reduce democratic influence, putting off the dreaded day when the existing 
republican structure would be threatened by the political and cultural damage caused 
by excessive wealth disparities. 
The founding generation considered tax powers and policies to be fundamental 
constitutional questions.  During the New York ratification debates, Hamilton 
defended the “unlimited power of taxation” as proper.90  At some point, all private 
property can become public: “In the course of a war, it may be necessary to lay hold 
of every resource: and, for a certain period, the people may submit to it.”91  The new 
central government would and should have the power to tax individuals directly 
instead of relying on the Article of Confederation’s inadequate alternative of 
requisitioning taxes from each of the States, a technique that forced the government 
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either to do nothing in the face of State recalcitrance or use coercive force against the 
State.  Quite simply, it would be far easier to collect money from individuals than 
States.  The leading Framers intended that this tax burden contain elements of 
equality and proportionality.  In Federalist No. 54, Madison explained that the 
Constitutional convention sought to allocate the tax burden based upon each State’s 
“proportion of wealth.”92  Because there was no easy way to measure wealth, the 
Framers relied on overall population as crude proxy for wealth (providing the South 
with extra representation for its slave capital through the three fifths rule).  
Furthermore, the Framers did not want to impose unequal burdens on different states.  
Making population the major variable alleviated the tax burden because an increase 
in a state’s population would mean more federal taxes but it also would provide that 
state with additional members in the House of Representatives, who would initially 
determine the extent and impact of any revenue laws.   
To different degrees, the Constitution’s leading advocates believed in 
proportional taxation.  These founders had ample precedent.  In 1768, John 
Dickinson had written in his highly influential Letters From a Pennsylvania Farmer 
that “[t]axes in every free state have been, and ought to be, as exactly proportioned 
as is possible to the abilities of those who are to pay for them.  They cannot 
otherwise be just. Even a Hottentot would comprehend the unreasonableness of 
making a poor man pay as much for “defending” the property of a rich man, as the 
rich man pays himself.”93  Hamilton explained: “The system will be founded upon 
the most easy and equal principles—to draw as much as possible from direct 
taxation; to lay the principal burthens on the wealthy.”94  Adam Smith criticized 
primogeniture and entail in The Wealth of Nations.95  
Thomas Jefferson never worried about the wealthy’s fate as much as his friend 
Madison; he believed this “artificial aristocracy” had sufficient power to protect 
themselves from majority oppression.96  Writing to Madison from France just before 
the French Revolution, Jefferson was dismayed at France’s concentration of wealth 
and power in so few hands: “I am conscious that an equal division of property is 
impracticable, but the consequences of this enormous inequality producing so much 
misery to the bulk of mankind, legislators cannot invent too many devices for 
subdividing property, only taking care to let their subdivisions go hand in hand with 
the natural affections of the human mind.”97  Jefferson recommended three means to 
achieve that end.  He supported proportional taxation because of its subtlety: 
“Another means of silently lessening the inequality of property is to exempt all from 
taxation below a certain point, and to tax the higher portions or property in geometric 
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progression as they rise.”98  He believed that uncultivated land should be made 
available to the poor: “Whenever there are in any country uncultivated lands and 
unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of property have been so far extended as to 
violate natural right.  The earth is given as common stock for man to labor and live 
on.”99 
Jefferson’s third solution brings us to the particular issue of death taxes, the focus 
of this conference, the issue this work has attempted to put into a deeper 
historical/conceptual context.  He led the movement in Virginia to end the laws of 
primogeniture and entail: “the descent of property of every kind therefore to all the 
children, or to all the brothers and sisters, or other relations in equal degree, is a 
politic measure and a practicable one.”100  In his Autobiography, he described 
egalitarian estate tax laws as part of “a system by which every fibre would be 
eradicated of ancient or future aristocracy; and a foundation laid for a government 
truly republican.”101  The rest of the system consisted of the right to freedom of 
conscience and the right to a decent public education.102  While hereditary rank may 
be the purest form of aristocracy, Jefferson also feared an “aristocracy of wealth.”103  
This aristocracy would continually attempt to subordinate the more necessary and 
useful elite, the aristocracy of talent and merit.104 
Although Madison was not as eager to tax the wealthy, he also supported the 
elimination of feudal laws of descent as one of the “silent operation of laws, which, 
without violating the rights of property, reduce extreme wealth towards a state of 
mediocrity, and raise extreme indigence towards a state of comfort.”105  As he 
explained to William Barry in a letter, “[I]n Governments like ours a constant 
rotation of property results from the free scope to industry, and from the laws of 
inheritance.”106  However, he was much more committed than Jefferson to preserving 
whatever distribution of wealth emerged from the competition between men’s 
faculties (at least as long as those men remained alive).  While he agreed that the 
country needed a powerful middling interest, he thought most people would be 
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satisfied if they believed they had a chance to obtain property under equal laws.107  
Madison was more prescient than his more romantic, idealistic friend.  Madison 
understood that the new forms of wealth created by trade and manufacturing would 
not be as easily divisible over time as land. The new manufacturing entities and 
commercial interests would create pools of wealth that could not be solved through 
the elimination of primogeniture and entail.108  In fact, society’s demand for capital 
to create additional wealth and to provide resources for defense would clash with the 
egalitarian republican laws of descent and distribution, creating a crisis that “will 
require for the task all the wisdom of the wisest patriots.”109 
Madison’s fears have been realized.  Each of us must use whatever wisdom and 
patriotism we have to determine the relevance and weight of the founding 
generation’s competing, changing constitutional visions.  Of course, this historical 
record is mixed.  There is much truth in Jennifer Nedelsky’s claim that “For the 
Framers, the protection of property meant the protection of unequal property and 
thus insulation of both property and inequality from democratic transformation.”110  
Nevertheless, there remains an egalitarian, republican strain that provides both 
guidance and authority for the belief that Congress must pass legislation to reduce 
the steadily increasingly wealth disparities that our eroding our republican 
constitutionalism.   
Has it been useful to characterize these enduring economic controversies as 
“constitutional?”  What difference, if any, does a word like “constitution” make?  
The above analysis and history could have been presented without attempting to 
“constitutionalize” it.  One powerful argument against this technique is the confusion 
created by inevitably created whenever one attempts to add new meanings to 
prevailing conceptions of important political concepts.  This article’s presentation is 
the best defense I can make for the technique: broader conceptions of 
constitutionality link us more closely to some of the best aspects (both normatively 
and analytically) of our Western intellectual tradition.  The current understanding of 
constitutionality creates the impression that our basic social issues will be and should 
be resolved by unelected experts called Supreme Court Justices, assisted by elite 
lawyers and law school intellectuals.  Implicit in such a technocratic conception of 
constitutionality is the assumption that most major constitutional issues have been 
resolved.  There will be some more squabbling over federalism, affirmative action, 
and abortion, but the basic issues of wealth and power are no longer constitutionally 
visible, much less contestable.  Characterizing major shifts in tax policy as 
constitutional issues emphasizes the centrality of those issues to the future meaning 
and well being of the American republic.  Many of us naively believed that the end 
of the Cold War would bring a “peace dividend” that would be used to assist the 
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impoverished and improve our overall public lives.  We had not read our history.  
After Rome finally defeated Carthage, the ruling class became far more rapacious.  
They did not need to persuade the citizens to maintain loyalty; they did not need 
large armies to fight external threats.  They could and did accelerate the plunder of 
public resources.  When the Gracchi brothers proposed agrarian laws that would 
have redistributed public lands to poorer citizens, the elite counterattacked by 
overthrowing the republic.  We are not doomed to repeat this history.  But we should 
understand that the seemingly narrow issue of estate and gift taxes is but a symptom 
of a change in our political culture, in our constitutional order. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Although it is attempting to conclude the article with a reassuring allocation of 
constitutional responsibilities between the elected branches and the Court, this 
article’s history raises some disturbing intimations about judicial review.  In the first 
paragraph, I relied upon Justice Holmes’ famous aphorism in Lochner as an 
authoritative reason for judicial deference to Congressional death tax policies: “ [A] 
constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of 
paternalism and the organic relation on the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.”111  
But that useful axiom is also profoundly misleading; the United States Constitution 
embodied a blend of particular economic theories, ranging from Madison’s primary 
goal of protecting the rich to Benjamin Franklin and James Wilson’s more 
egalitarian and democratic vision.112  Economic concerns and interests dominate the 
document’s history and permeate its text.  James Wilson bluntly explained at the 
Constitutional Convention: “All the principal powers of the Nat. Legislature had 
some relation to money.”113  Every time a Supreme Court Justice is forced to 
confront (or avoid) a constitutional issue that has economic implications, the Justice 
should first consider the Founding generation’s views.  While that history should not 
be considered conclusive, it creates a heavy presumption in favor of propertied 
interests.  In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,114 Holmes himself relied on some 
kind of an economic perspective to conclude that the State of Pennsylvania had 
unconstitutionally “taken” property from coal owners when it required them to leave 
some of the coal in the land to keep the land’s surface from collapsing.   
Aside from equally potent external factors, powerful internal forces combine to 
make American jurisprudence a bastion of economic conservatism.  The 
Constitution’s history and text are filled with preferences for the wealthy.  De 
Tocqueville observed that American lawyers serve as an aristocracy committed to 
the preservation and augmentation of existing distributions of power.  The Supreme 
Court (staffed by those aristocratic lawyers in an institution providing the aristocratic 
protection of lifetime tenure) has consistently created legal doctrine to protect the 
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opulent from “majoritarian tyranny.”   Even a judicial shift to formal equality and 
economic neutrality would not prevent the society from losing its republican 
equilibrium by concentrating too much power in too few unaccountable hands.  Jean 
Jacques Rousseau observed that formal equality benefits the rich and powerful 
because they already have the economic, intellectual, and cultural assets to flourish 
under such a system.115  Although one needs to go far beyond legal analysis when 
making cultural comparisons, the American Constitution’s ancient commitment to 
private power and tyranny, which can be traced back to Madisonian principles and 
the protection of slavery, helps explain why for over a century this country has lead 
the wealthy industrial world in the ruthless exploitation of its workers.  Periodically, 
this structural preference for the rich combines with political, cultural, and economic 
forces to create dangerous and unjust balances of power.  There is no other similar 
country that has left tens of millions of its workers without any health care.  No other 
country is contemplating the long-term concentration of wealth and power in a few 
families by completely eliminating estate and gift taxes.  Despite or even because of 
their peculiar forms of conservatism, Madison and Jefferson foresaw this day and 
provided us with remedies to combat republican corruption.  With each passing year, 
the elected branches are under a greater constitutional obligation to begin rectifying 
the situation.  They can start by preserving estate and gift taxes, purging the electoral 
system of its reliance on private wealth, and requiring that all employers provide 
their employees with a living wage and basic benefits. 
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